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ABSTRACT 
Many methods have been developed to secure the network infrastructure and communication 
over the Internet. Intrusion detection is a relatively new addition to such techniques. Intrusion 
detection systems (IDS) are used to find out if someone has intrusion into or is trying to get it the 
network. One big problem is amount of Intrusion which is increasing day by day. We need to know 
about network attack information using IDS, then analysing the effect. Due to the nature of IDSs which 
are solely signature based, every new intrusion cannot be detected; so it is important to introduce 
artificial intelligence (AI) methods / techniques in IDS. Introduction of AI necessitates the importance 
of normalization in intrusions. This work is focused on classification of AI based IDS techniques which 
will help better design intrusion detection systems in the future. We have also proposed a support 
vector machine for IDS to detect Smurf attack with much reliable accuracy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the problems for computer network’s intrusion detection system that passively monitor a 
network link is the ability of a skilled attacker to evade detection by exploiting ambiguities in the 
traffic stream as seen by the network intrusion detection system (NIDS). [1] [3] The NIDS may less 
capability complete analysis for the full range of behaviour allowed by a particular protocol. For 
instance, attacker may be evade a NIDS that fails to reassemble IP fragments by their attack traffic. 
The traffic normalization mechanisms belong to the wide set of tools that help the allocation, control of 
resources in TCP/IP networks, and base system of improve the reliability NIDS. [3] Many technique 
can be to classify network traffic. The more skilled method is neural network. However, one 
requirement of such system is normal traffic. Then a key problem is how to choose the attributes of the 
input training data. In this paper, we use a support vector machine algorithm based on the KDDCUP 99 
dataset. This paper produces a support vector machine for network intrusion detection that can detect 
smurf attack in network with accuracy of 99.6%. Also this system can predict the percentage of smurf 
infection in the network with absolute error average from 0% to 5%. One of intrusion detection 
methods is misuse detection technique. The frequently utilize a rule-based approach. When applied to 
misuse detection, rules become scenarios for network attacks.  
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss related work. Section 3 is the problem 
statement of intrusion detection system. Section 4 introduces our solution and experiment of intrusion 
detection with support vector machine. This paper is ended with a conclusion and future work. 
2. RELATED WORK 
During the last years, IDS alert processing techniques have received considerable amount of 
attention in the research community. [5] Some researcher has proposed machine learning method for 
IDS alert normalization and classification, in order to reduce the amount of false positives. In 1999, the 
KDD conference hosted a classifier learning contest, in which the learning task was to build a 
predictive model to differentiate attacks and normal connections. Contestants trained and tested their 
classifiers on an intrusion data set provided by MIT labs. All these work above use features of the 
KDDCUP 99 training and testing data. Sung et al. use SVMs and neural networks to identify important 
features for 1998 DARPA intrusion detection data. The most related work to ours is done by Dongxi 
Liu, Chi-Hung Chi and Ming Li. [3] Their achieve goal, they insert a thin layer between the network 
layer and the link layer. Thus, during every unit time period, only one packet is sent (either a regular 
packet from the network layer or a padded packet when no regular packet is available, i.e. a dummy 
packet). Moreover, if the packet to be sent is shorter than an expected length, some extra bytes are 
padded to its rear so that packets sent by one network node always have constant size with constant 
rate, i.e., normalized traffic, in which dummy packet and extra bytes together make up the 
complementary traffic. [3] 
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
We need intelligence IDS but the system making first step is traffic classification and 
normalization. First, packet level normalization would vanish in a puff of logic. However, there is not 
one implementation, but many and each can behave uniquely under identical stimulation. We are 
making first, normalization data by using normal traffic. In evaluating normalize; we care about 
completeness, correctness, and performance [4] [3]. The evaluation presents a challenging problem 
because by definition most of the functionality of a normalize applies only to unusual or impossible 
traffic and the results of a normalizer in general are invisible to connection endpoints. The problem 
here is to obtain test traffic that exhibits the behaviour we wish to normalize; once this is done, we need 
to ensure that norm correctly normalizes it. TTL setting on incoming packets from attacker causes 
some packets to be dropped after being inspected by the NIDS. End system only sees packets with 
longer TTL. Then NIDS misses attack. Fig 1 [11] shows one example of normalization of packets 
evasion technique. 
 Fig.1. Normalization of packet 
 
4. SOLUTION 
First, we make IP normalization, because our historical research result shows that IP attack we 
occurred more frequently on campus network traffic. Two kinds of normalization topology, one is with 
firewall, shown on Fig 2 and another one is without firewall, shown on Fig 3. In the case of experiment 
using NIDS without firewall, we can get the log which is marked by alerted, inserted and dropped 
packets. 
Alternative solution is using a host based IDS. But it maybe costly, for used too many hosts in 
network subnet. Also probable assemble was only intranet network information.  [2] [3] [9] 
Normalizer can normalize and protect additional functions of firewall. We can get this kind of 
normalizer from the results which is normalise on IP packets. The normalizer is able to reduce a load of 
NIDS such as reject packets with wrong checksums.  
Also we normalized following parameters of IP packet: Header length, Total packet length, DF flag, 
MF flag, TTL. The most of attack scan be occurred on structure of IP packet. For instance, TTL 
problem was occurred, attacker may exploit knowledge of network topology to cause some packets to 
be dropped. Then this attack type’s solution is set all TTL fields to be larger than the longest path 
inside network. One of more occurred problem is packet with invalid total length field may be dropped 
or accepted by end system. In most cases NIDS don’t know. Solution of this attack, discard if field 
longer than actual; trim if packet was occurred longer than field normal length. 
 
Figure 1 Illustrating possible configurations of a Normalizer /with firewall/ 
 Figure 2 Illustrating possible configurations of a Normalizer /without firewall/ 
So we are making TCP, ICMP traffic normalization. We are used Linux /kernel 2.5/. One of the 
problems is network traffic copying from memory to memory. Our experiment result of performance is 
shown in Table 1. PC can forward 333.000 packets/s. [4] 
 
We are making traffic classification with support vector machine. Then detection making by 
support vector machine and decision tree algorithm with smurf attack on DTREG tool.  
 
Smurf attack detection condition is hot indication count <=0.0, last 2 second connection counts REJ 
error >0.21 and <=0.01 and connection to host count <= from 41.2 to 112.3. Shown on Figure 4 is 
attack normalization example. 
 
Figure 4. Attack normalization example 
 
This model is used to identify smurf attack from KDDCUP 99 dataset; it can also predict the attack 
percentage in the network traffic. This model depends only on the data that collected from the IDS and 
KDDCUP 99. As shown in Figure 5, this model consists of 3 modules: (1) Training data (2) Testing 
data (3) Cross-over. 
 Figure 5. Model of identify smurf attack 
In the experiment, we use count of traffic 100.0 and count of parameter 7. Table 1 shows the results 
of phase identify smurf attack. 
 
Table 1. The result of identify smurf attack. 
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Class 
0.996 0 1 0.99 0.998 0.998 Normal traffic 
1 0.004 0.999 1 0.999 0.998 Smurf attack 
Weighted 
Avg. 
0.999 0.003 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998  
 
If it gets less number of parameter which is used to detect the attack from normalized packets, the 
performance of detection is increase. The method selects parameters which are hot indication count, 
connection count REJ error, and connection to host count and transferred bytes from source, and 
detects Smurf attack by 99.9 percent.  
 
5. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we proposed a method to detect the occurrence and intensity of Smurf attack based on 
the change of self-similarity in network traffic and normalization of network traffic. Choosing 
parameter is depending on attack type. Smurf attack basic parameters are logged in, guest flat login etc. 
We have improved normalization method from the experimental results. The normalization is 
calibrated by KDDCUP dataset and our campus network normal traffic. We have used Support vector 
machine with KDDCUP dataset and campus network traffic in WEKA and DTREG tools. Our 
proposed system can detect Smurf attack in network with accuracy of 99.6%.   
6. FUTURE WORK 
In the future, we will implement and design hardware intelligence intrusion detection system using 
this improved normalization method and classification method. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
We are thankful to Asia Research Centre of National University of Mongolia for their support in the 
research. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Handley, Mark. Paxson, Vern. Kreibich, Christian. Cited as REF [4] in “Network Intrusion 
Detection: Evasion, Traffic Normalization, and End to End protocol Semantics” 
[2] Ptacek, Thomas H.Newsham, Timothy N. “Insertion, Evasion, and Denial of Service: Eluding 
Network Intrusion Detection” Jan 1998 
[3] Dongxi Liu, Chi-Hung Chi, Ming Li, “Normalizing Traffic Pattern with Anonymity for Mission 
Critical Applications” 
[4] S. Kent and R.Atkinson, “Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol”, RFC 2401. 
[5] Y.Guan, C. Li, D. Xuan, R.Bettati, and W.Zhao, “Preventing Traffic Analysis for Real-Time 
Communication Networks,” Proc., The IEEE Military Communication Conference (MILCOM’99), 
Nov. 1999, 
[6] Malan, G.Robert. Watson, David. Jahanian, Farman. Howell, Paul. “Transport and Application 
Protocol Sctubbing” March 2000. 
[7] Manuel Crotti, Maurizio Dusi, Francesco Gringoli, Luca Salgarelli, “Traffic Classification 
Through Simple Statistical Fingerprinting” 
[8] D. Moore, K. Keys, R. Koga, E. Lagache, and K. C.Claffy. The CoralReef Software Suite as a 
Tool for System and Network Administrators. In LISA ’01: Proceedings of the 15th USENIX 
conference on Systems Administration, pages 133–144, San Diego, CA, USA, December 2001. 
[9] V. Paxson. Empirically derived analytic models of wide-area TCP connections. IEEE/ACM Trans. 
Netw., 2(4):316–336, 1994. 
[10] C. Trivedi, H. J. Trussel, A. Nilsson, and M-Y. Chow. Implicit Traffic Classification for Service 
Differentiation. Technical report, ITC Specialist Seminar, Wurzburg, Germany, July 2002. 
[11] Nikos Drakos, Computer Based Learning Unit, University of Leeds. “Network Intrusion 
Detection: Evasion, Traffic normalization and End-to-End protocol semantics” 
 
